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On the 29th of February 2004, thousands of robed members of Hizbut Tahrir marched 
through the streets of downtown Jakarta to mark the 80th anniversary of the fall of the 
caliphate – when Kemal Ataturk in the name of Turkish nationalism, having already 
abolished the Ottoman sultanate, deposed its last sultan as Caliph.  
 
Hizbut Tahrir is a ‘new’ Islamic movement in Indonesia, one among many whose 
primary roots are planted within a wider Islamic ambience outside of Indonesia1. Its call 
for the restoration of a universal caliphate and its rejection of nationalism and state power 
would have, in an earlier period under President Suharto, met with immediate suspicion 
and probable suppression. The movement is a good exemplar of the changing Indonesian 
Islamic community, pointing metaphorically in two directions: to the contemporary state 
of ferment in the Islamic world and to historical developments of the past century. Thus 
the present situation in Indonesia, as indeed within the Islamic world as a whole, may be 
considered in all of its immediacy or as the continuation of a long and as yet unresolved 
phase in Muslim history. 
 
For those who follow current Islamic debates on the Internet, Hizbut Tahrir is also 
instructive. Within days of Syaikh ‘Abdurrahman Ad Dimasqiyah’s denunciation of the 
Hizbut Tahrir in a sermon given in English (and probably delivered in England), an 
appropriately edited version of this sermon appeared in Indonesian on the As-Salafy 
website.  Thus, as has been the case for centuries, Indonesia is firmly, intimately and 
inextricably linked to diverse sources of ideas and debate in the Islamic world and 
consequently subject to its many internal reverberations2.  
                                                 
1 Hizbut Tahrir (Hizb-e Tahrir) is by no means a ‘new’ movement elsewhere. Founded in the 
Middle East, it has been in existence for decades and has active branches in Europe and the 
United States. Hizbut Tahrir was brought to Indonesia from Australia. See Marcia Hermansen’s 
“How to put the Genie Back in the Bottle? ‘Identity’ Islam and Muslim Youth Cultures in 
America” pp.313-314 in Omid Safi (ed), Progressive Muslims (2003); Elizabeth Collins, 
“Dakwah and Democracy” (nd).  
2 Because of its historical receptiveness, Indonesia has some of the richest and most 
diverse traditions in the Islamic world. The founding traditions of Islam in Indonesia 
derive from a variety of sources – the Arab world, Persia, India and, as is becoming 
increasingly evident, from the Muslim trading communities of southern China. Equally 
important to the historical development of Islam has been the active pursuit of Islamic 
teaching by generations of Indonesian Muslims who have journeyed to study in Mecca, 
Cairo and other centers of learning in the Middle East. Although Sunni by long tradition, 
Indonesian Muslims have also been open – and continue to be open – to Shia religious 
ideas.  There is therefore hardly a development in the Muslim world that does not have its 
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Historical Observations: Foundations of Mutuality and Difference 
 
Hizbut Tahrir’s agenda is a reminder that the period of the 1920s was as tumultuous a 
time in Islamic history as the present.  The end of the caliphate occurred in the same year 
as the conquest of the Hejaz (Mecca and Medina) by the Wahabis under al-Saud. These 
two events in 1924 produced reactions throughout the Islamic world including Indonesia. 
 
Through much of the 19th century, there was an increasing movement of Indonesian 
pilgrims to Mecca, many of whom stayed on to form what was called the Jawi 
community. By the late 19th century this Jawi was one of the largest communities in 
Mecca with its own contingent of distinguished teachers, some of whom were granted the 
privilege of teaching within the Haram.  
 
The Jawi community in Mecca was at the center of the activities of the tarekat (tariqa), 
the Sufi mystic orders, whose reach extended widely in Indonesia. Of particular 
importance was Shaykh Ahmad Khatib Sambas, a teacher at Masjid al-Haram, who is 
credited with founding Tarekat Qadiriyyah-Naqshabandiyyah, a fusion of the separate 
Qadiriyyah and Nashabandiyyah orders. He initiated various Indonesian kalifah whose 
authority through different pesantren perpetuated the religious teachings (tasawwuf) and 
devotional practices that are an essential (and characteristic) component of Indonesian, 
particularly Javanese, Islam. 
 
Increasingly, however, Cairo with its great teaching center, al-Azar, offered an alternative 
to Mecca as a source of reforming ideas. A new generation of Indonesians were attracted 
to Cairo and became deeply influenced by the ideas of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97) 
interpreted initially by Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905) and later by his successor, 
Rashid Rida (1865-1935) 3 . In particular, ‘Abduh ideas on educational reform and 
technical advancement for Muslims were crucial to the founding of Muhammadiyah in 
1912, which, to this day, continues as a major institution for the Islamic community of 
Indonesia4.  
                                                                                                                                                 
counterpart in contemporary Indonesia. Without a doubt, the most useful starting point for an 
understanding of the historical networks linking Southeast Asia to the Middle East is Azyumardi 
Azra’s The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Networks of Malay-Indonesian and 
Middle Eastern ‘Ulama’ in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (2004). See also Peter 
Riddell: Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World: Transmission and Responses (2001). 
3 These ideas were transmitted to Indonesia through two key literary publications: ‘Abduh and 
Rida’s al-Manar (The Beacon) and its Sumatran counterpart al-Munir (The Radiant). For a period 
of a few years from 1912, there was also a Malay paper, Al-Ittihahad (Unity) published in Cairo 
by the small Jawi community studying there (see Laffan, 2003 pp.136-141). Also of great 
importance for reformist ideas was the Malay publication, al-Imam, published in Singapore. 
These and other print media sources were part of a wider national awakening that drew upon an 
increasing educated population. 
4Achmad Dachlan (1868-1923), the founder of Muhammadiyah, was the son of a khatib from 
Yogyakarta.  He studied in Mecca in the 1890s and was influenced by Achmad Khatib al-
Minangakabawi who was the leading Jawi teacher of his time. However, he was also strongly 
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In Indonesia in the 1920s, amid strong nationalist stirrings, a division between self-
proclaimed ‘reformists and modernists’ and so-called ‘traditionalists’ came to the fore 
over issues of the caliphate and of the conquest of Mecca by the Wahabi 5 . The 
traditionalists whose links were to the learned community of Jawi teachers in Mecca were 
deeply disturbed by the actions of the Wahabi and fearful of what might occur next. A 
number of prominent members of the Jawi community were killed in the fighting and 
many more suffered privations from the lack of supplies following the seizure of the holy 
places. More importantly, however, core religious practices of the traditional Jawi – 
particularly visitation (ziarah) to the tombs in Mecca and Medina, many of which were 
the gathering place of the Sufi orders (tarekat) – were seen as heretical by the Wahabi 
and forcibly suppressed.  
 
Of these the most serious was the destruction of the tombs at the grave complex at 
Medina. To the Kaum Tua Jawa this was seen as gross religious desecration. The 
community feared that the tomb of the prophet would also be destroyed. As a result, more 
than a third of the Jawi community returned to Indonesia en masse in a number of 
chartered relief ships, bringing with them stories of sacrilege and atrocities. 
 
By contrast, some reformists among the Kaum Muda saw merit in the changes that were 
occurring in Mecca, which provided the opportunity to advance the reform ideas of 
Muhammad ‘Abduh and others in Cairo. That Rashid Rida in Cairo proclaimed the 
Wahabis to be the faction of ‘purest faith’ in Islam only increased the tension between the 
two communities in Indonesia. Some of the Kaum Tua even went so far as to label the 
Kaum Muda as ‘Wahabi’ – the worst possible term of derision. Having failed in an effort 
to send a unified delegation from Indonesia to a conference on the Caliphate (initially to 
Cairo, then later to Mecca), a group of twelve ulama, under the spiritual aegis of the 
Hasyim Ashari (1875-1947) and the political guidance of Abdul Wahab Chasbullah, met 
in Surabaya in January 1926 and formed the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU: The Awakening of 
the Ulama) to represent and to defend their traditions of Islam6. In Indonesia, Nahdlatul 
Ulama was to become the largest Islamic grouping in the country. The banner that the 
NU adopted to represent itself was a globe that portrayed Indonesia within the Muslim 
world7.  In membership, NU was also to become the largest Muslim organization in the 
Islamic world. 
                                                                                                                                                 
influenced by the ideas emanating from Cairo and is known to have subscribed to both al-Manar 
and al-Munir.      
5 This division was given a generational identification: the reformists who looked to Cairo were 
identified as the Kaum Moeda (the Young Group); this group had a considerable Sumatran 
component. By contrast, the traditionalists who had looked to Mecca were identified as the Kaum 
Tua (the Old Group) and were comprised of a majority of the ulama and their followers in Java. 
6 Because of what was happening in Mecca and Medina, the primary intention of the group of 
ulama was to establish a “Komite Hijaz” to travel to Mecca to present their views to Ibn Sau’d; 
the formation of Nahdlatul Ulama was intended to give domestic support to the Komite. Some 
two years later, Wahab Chasbullah did lead a delegation from NU that met with Ibn Sau’d (see 
Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, Relas-relasi Kuasa, Pencari Wacana Baru, 1994: 34). 
7 Michael Laffan’s Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia (pp.222-231) provides an 
excellent account of this period. He points out that the global representation adopted by Nahdlatul 
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The late 1920s also saw the beginnings of another Muslim organization in Egypt, the 
Muslim Brotherhood (Ikwanul Muslimin) under Syahid Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) that 
would – some fifty years later – begin to exert influence in Indonesia. It took time and 
contemporary pressures outside of Indonesia as well as conditions in Indonesia itself for 
the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood to assume relevance suitable for their transmission 
to Indonesia. 
 
Modernists and Traditionalists in Indonesia 
 
Historically, mutuality, rather than dichotomous opposition, has characterized relations 
between ‘modernists’ and ‘traditionalists’ in Indonesia. The modernists, as represented by 
Muhammadiyah and drawing specifically on the ideas of Muhammad ‘Abduh that called 
for the scientific and intellectual strengthening of the Muslim community, have had an 
enormous influence through their own network of schools and universities but have also 
influenced the traditionalists to adopt new methods of teaching and new subjects of study 
within their own pesantren schooling system8.   
 
In regard to the interpretation of Islamic law, most modernists (despite ‘Abhub’s 
exhortations) and all traditionalists adhere to the Syafi’i mazhab. This marks a significant 
defining characteristic of Islam in Southeast Asia – not just Indonesia but also Malaysia 
and the Philippines9.  Modernists, however, claim a degree of interpretative independence 
(ijtihad) in arriving at decisions within the law whereas traditionalists insist on taqlid, an 
interpretative process that relies critically on the teachings of the great ulama of the past. 
This process is by no means as ‘rigid’ as the modernists claim. Indeed, some scholars 
have observed that in the transition to the 21st century, traditionalist ulama show a greater 
degree of flexibility in legal interpretation than modernists who still draw on a position 
originally developed at the beginning of the 20th century. 
 
It is largely in the practice of Islam that modernists differ from traditionalists. Modernists 
do not participate in the tarekat, religious orders that are fundamental to NU, nor do they, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ulama is modeled on a similar global representation on the cover of the publication, Seruan 
Azhar (Call of Azhar), produced by the Kaum Muda community of students in Cairo in 1925. The 
3rd al-Islam Conference in Surabaya, held in 1924 less than two years prior to the formation of 
NU, was regarded as a model of Indonesian Muslim unity (see Bruinessen 1995). 
8 For a basic historical study of Muhammadiyah and the development of its schooling system, see 
Alfian, Muhammadiyah: The Political Behaviour of a Muslim Modernist Organization under 
Dutch Colonialism (1989). For an equivalent study of NU and its pesantren system, see Dhofier, 
The Pesantren Tradition: The Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of Traditional Islam on Java 
(1982/1998) 
9 Sunni Muslims recognize four mazhab: Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Syafi’i. All are regarded as 
orthodox but a Muslim should adhere to only one mazhab and not mix and choose among them.  
As part of his reform agenda, Muhammad ‘Abduh called for the dissolution of the four mazhab. 
Most of Egypt has continued to adhere to the Syafii mazhab. The Wahabi, in keeping with their 
claim to follow the earliest forms of Islam (before any differentiation into mazhab) assert that 
they belong to mazhab, yet their practice, in its literal emphasis, is aligned with the Hanbali 
tradition.  
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unlike the traditionalists, see Islamic mystic traditions (tasawwuf) as part of their practice 
of Islam. Indeed they have little regard for the panoply of rituals that organize the lives of 
most traditional Muslims10. 
 
The most marked differences occur in regard to practices associated with the dead. These 
practices for the traditionalists include a variety of ceremonies at the time of death, 
visitations to the tombs of the so-called Wali Songo, the nine founders of Islam on Java 
as well as to the graves of other local saints and revered ancestral personages 11 and large 
commemorative gatherings, khaul, to honor deceased religious teachers (in Java known 
as kyai) and their descendants. Modernists reject all of these practices, considering them 
to be a sinful form of idolatry (syirk).  
 
For traditionalists, such practices are all part of a chain of transmission, through 
generations of saints and learned teachers, to the companions of the Prophet and to the 
Prohet himself.  As Abdurrahman Wahid is reported to have affirmed, membership in 
Nahdlatul Ulama is an association that does not end with one’s death 12. 
 
The Religious Foundations of the Nahdlatul Ulama 
 
At the outset of his presidency, Abdurrahman Wahid wrote a Foreword for the 
publication of a short treatise Risalah Ahlussunnah wal Jama’ah by his grandfather, the 
Great Sheiyk, Hasyim Asy’ari, who was one of the founders of NU.  The treatise was 
originally written to define the ‘traditions’ that NU considers as central to its claim to 
upholders of ‘sunnah and the Sunni community’ (alhusunnah wal jama’ah: Aswaja).  
 
The Great Sheiyk defines this tradition succinctly and authoritatively: Sunnah can be 
identified by an unbroken continuity with the past and by the avoidance of 
innovation/deviation (bid’ah).  Specifically for the Jawi, this tradition had clear 
intellectual and religious foundations: 
 
                                                 
10 The best single account of the full range of these rituals can be found in the thesis/book by 
Muhaimin on the Cirebon region of the north coast of Java, which was one of the earliest centers 
of Islam on the island. This thesis, The Islamic Traditions of Cirebon: Adat and Ibadat among 
Javanese Muslims (1995) has been published in Indonesian translation as Islam Dalam Bingkai 
Budaya Lokal: Potret dari Cirebon (2001). Two other excellent studies of the practice of Islam at 
the village level are theses by M. Bambang Pranowo, Creating Islamic Tradition in Rural Java 
(1991) and Jamhari, Popular Voices of Islam: Discourse on Muslim Orientations in South 
Central Java (2000). An illuminating study of reformism at the village level is Kim Hung-Jun, 
Reformist Muslims in a Yogyakarta Village: The Islamic Transformation of Contemporary Socio-
Religious Life (1996). 
11 I have written a number of papers on the practice of ziarah in Java. See Fox 1991: ‘Ziarah 
Visits to the Tombs of the Wali, The Founders of Islam on Java’; 1998:‘Wali: The First Preachers 
of Islam in Java’; 2002: ‘Interpreting the Significance of Tombs and Chronicles in Contemporary 
Java’. Another excellent paper on this topic is that by Jamhari 2000: ‘In the Centre of Meaning: 
Ziarah Tradition in Java’. 
12 See Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Back to Situbondo? Nahdlatul Ulama Attitudes towards 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s Presidency and Fall’ (nd). 
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“Since the beginning, Muslims of the Jawa region have had one philosophy, 
one mazhab, one source. In law (fiqh), they adhere to the great path, the 
mazhab of Iman Syafi’i; in theology (ushuluddin), they follow the path of 
Abu Al-Hasan Al-Asyari; and in mystic teachings (tasawwuf), they follow 
the path of Imam Al-Ghazali and Imam Abi Al-Hasan As-Syadzili.” (1999:7) 
 
He then goes on to contrast this tradition with the emergence of innovation among 
Muslims in Java.  He alludes to the two most important modernists of his time, 
Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rasyid Ridla but instead of assigning deviation (bid’ah) to them, 
he attributes it to the influence in their thinking of Ahmad bin Taimiyyah and his 
students13. This carries the argument within Islam itself back from the 20th century to the 
14th century. It is also a prescient perception of a continuing difference. 
 
Virtually all Islamic ‘reformists’ – whether of the Wahabi tradition, or of the Al-
Afghani/’Abduh modernist tradition, or of the Al-Banna/Sayyid Qutb tradition of the 
Muslim Brotherhoods – draw inspiration from the writings of Ibn Taimiyyah. When 
combined within Hanbali mazhab, which is the most emphatically literal in its 
interpretation of fiqh, such reforming ideas stand in stark contrast to the traditions that 
Hasyim Ashy’ari defines as sunnah. By the same token, these reformists would reject the 
teachings of Al-Asyari and Al-Ghazali.  These differences are therefore not peripheral 
but central and fundamental. 
 
Tauhid, Ibadah and Dakwah 
 
Nothing is more fundamental in Islam than an understanding of tauhid, the conception of 
the ‘Unity of God’. If one adopts an idea of tauhid that excludes all analogy, similarity or 
quality – as do the Wahabi in their strict interpretation as true ‘Unitarians’ or as other 
reformists do in keeping with Ibn Taimiyyah’s ideas – then one’s conception can only 
proceed by negation. The total Otherness of God stands in opposition to, and in total 
contrast with, the world as it is known.  
 
If, on the other hand, one adopts an inclusive conception of tauhid in accordance with the 
ideas of Al-Asyari and more particularly those of Al-Ghazali and other Sufi teachers, 
then one’s conception is based on affirmation. God informs the world and it is possible to 
strive for the Sufi ideal of union with God – something that reformists regard as 
inconceivable and utterly blasphemous14. 
 
                                                 
13 It is interesting to note that Hasyim Asy’ari reserves his strongest criticism for Ibn Taimiyyah 
over the issue of visitations to the Tomb of the Prophet. He cites Taimiyyah’s assertion that 
however well intentioned Muslims may be in performing ziarah to the Prophet’s tomb as an act 
of worship (ibadah), such actions are strictly forbidden (1999:8). 
14 These differences are said to be expressed in contrasting interpretative views of the Muslim 
testimony of faith (shahadah): the reformist view by negation: There is no god except Allah; and 
the traditional view by affirmation: There is no god except Allah.  (See Tawhid in the The 
Concise Encyclopedia of Islam 1989:400.) 
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These fundamental differences in regard to the world influence the way in which Islam is 
practiced and most pertinently, the way Islam is preached. For the traditionalists, all 
actions depend on intention (niyat). Thus intention defines and transforms one’s actions15. 
By this means, all one’s deeds, works and actions can be transformed into a kind of 
worship (ibadah/ibadat).  
 
This traditionalist view is clearly expressed by Muhaimin in his study of the Islamic 
traditions of the Javanese of Cirebon. Quoting Nasr16, he writes: 
 
“Thus…`everything is essentially sacred and nothing is profane because 
everything bears within itself the fragrance of the Divine.’ Therefore, ibadat, 
in this sense, may range from expressing daily courtesies to such things as 
the formal and solemn invocation both in and outside of formal prescribed 
prayers, and other forms of worship…Thus, the distinction between amal 
[one’s work] and ibadat becomes elusive. Both ibadat and amal require niyat 
(intention) which becomes the stamp that the work is for God.  Another way 
to ensure intention is by uttering or murmuring Basmalah (a phrase, saying 
‘In the name of Allah, the Beneficient, the Merciful’). Thus doing any (good) 
thing, a religious or worldly matter, become ibadat, by merely preceding it 
with Basmalah.” (1995:118-119) 
 
In this view, all that is not forbidden (haram) can be made Islamic. For a traditionalist, 
‘islamizing’ the world has more to do with consecrating the world than with transforming 
it. The exemplary methods cited for this process of ‘islamizing’ [mengislamkan] the 
world are those of the earliest founders of Islam, the great Wali or Saints of Java17. 
 
Dakwah, the preaching of Islam, takes on a different sense for most reformists.  Among 
reformists, there are degrees and gradations in how God’s otherness from the world is 
conceived and in how this effects and directs one’s relation to it. For most reformists, this 
requires some form of separation and distinction. Flirtation with the ways of the world is 
not possible. The call for dakwah therefore requires a double transformation: a 
transformation of the Muslim community (umat) with a corresponding transformation of 
the world. How radical a transformation is needed depends on how alien or threatening 
the ways of the world are seen to be. The most convincing models for such 
transformation draw their inspiration from the actions of the Prophet and his Companions.  
                                                 
15 The five primary guiding principles of NU (al-qawa’id al-khams al kubra) are: 1) Each action 
depends on the intention; 2) Certainty can not be removed by doubt; 3) Danger must be 
eliminated; 4) Whatever has become customary is acknowledged; and 5) Difficulty brings ease.  
Behind these simple seeming maxims lies a complex erudition that supports the application of 
these principles. See Greg Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Islam: A History of Nahdlatul Ulama, 
1952-1967 (1998), particularly Chapter II, Religio-Political Thought, 48-78.  
16 S. H. Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought (1981:7) 
17 A good example of this view can be found in Widji Saksono’s Mengislamkan Tanah Jawa: 
Telaah atas Methode Dakwah Walisongo [Islamizing Jawa: A Study based on the Methods of 
Preaching by the Nine Saints] (1995), a volume that has gone through multiple reprints. 
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For some, the possibilities for a transformed and viable Muslim community require an 
Islamic state.  
 
The Tarbiyah Movement   
 
Allegiances to different streams of Muslim orientation in Indonesia are difficult to 
determine with precision. One recent survey reported that forty-two percent of 
Indonesia’s Muslim population of over 200 million aligned themselves with the NU 
traditions and twelve percent with the Muhammadiyah traditions18. Historically NU has 
had a strong rural basis, particularly in Java, whereas Muhammidayah has been strongly 
urban and distinctly middle-class in memberships. For the past two decades or more, 
these distinctions have begun to blur and for many of a younger generation, different 
streams of thought have merged. Reform and renewal have taken new directions outside 
the bounds of previous allegiance. Even to identify the directions of various new 
movements within Indonesia is problematic in that they exist in a flux of development. 
 
The most significant of these movements is identified by different names and includes 
within it a number of streams. Some observers refer to this movement as the Dakwah 
movement, others refer to it as the Tarbiyah movement. At its inception, it was called the 
Salman Mosque movement and became (and remains) a campus-based revival movement. 
It is also the movement in which the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikwanul Muslimin) 
were able to take root and flourish19 
 
The initial stirrings of this movement in Bandung during the 1970s were considered a 
prelude to the beginning of the 15th century according to the Islamic calendar, a century 
anticipated as a period of Islamic resurgence 20 . It also coincided with the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran. The leader of the movement that began at the Salman Mosque, was an 
electrical engineer, M. Imaduddin Abdulrahmin, who held a teaching position at the 
Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), Indonesia’s most prestigious institution of higher 
learning for science and technology.   
 
                                                 
18 This and other surveys of a similar kind have been conducted by the Centre for the Study of 
Islam and Society in Indonesia (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat) in Jakarta and 
published in Tempo. See, for example, Tempo 29 December 2001. 
19 The literature on this movement provides a varied glance at its development. There is an 
excellent thesis by Rifki Rosyad, A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the Islamic Resurgence 
Movement among the Youth in Bandung, Indonesia, which focuses on the early phase of the 
movement in Bandung. V. S. Naipaul happened to visit Bandung at this time and has reproduced 
an interview with the movement’s founder in his book, Among the Believers. A useful recent 
book, which began as a sociology thesis at the University of Indonesia, by Ali Said Damanik, 
Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahu Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia covers the 
movement into its political phase. There are also valuable analyses, as yet unpublished:  “Dakwah 
and Democracy: The Significance of Party Keadilan and Hizbut Tharir” by Elizabeth Collins and 
“Creating ‘Total Muslims’: The Tarbiyah Movement and the Rise of Neo-Revivalism in 
Indonesia” by Greg Fealy. 
20 According to a well-known Hadith, at the turn of each new century there should occur a call for 
religious renewal and a return to the basic sources of Islam. See Rifki Rosyad, 1995: 9-10. 
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Imaduddin or “Bang Imad”, as he was popularly referred to, was a Sumatran whose 
father had studied at Al-Azhar in Cairo and had become one of the leaders of the 
Masyumi party before President Suharto banned it in his attempt to control and direct 
Muslim politics during the New Order21.   Imaduddin studied at ITB and then did a 
Masters degree at Iowa State University. After returning to teach at ITB, he took up a 
position at the University of Technology Malaysia (ITM) in Kuala Lumpur22. Throughout 
his career – as a counter to what he regarded as the extreme secularization of national 
universities – Imaduddin involved himself in student affairs and in a variety of Islamic 
training activities.  
 
Under the auspices of the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, 
Imaduddin was able to travel widely and to establish contact with other Islamic 
organizations. On his return to Bandung in the early 1970s, he transformed his Islamic 
training program, originally known as the Latihan Managemen Dakwah [Dakwah 
Management Training], into the Latihan Dakwah Mujahid [Dakwah Defender Training]. 
For his new training program, he relied upon key ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood 
[Ikhwanul Muslimin] of Egypt and, to a lesser extent, those of the Jami’at Islami of 
Pakistan. These included both religious and organizational ideas, focusing on small 
groups (referred to as usroh) of university students who underwent intensive training that 
concluded with a commitment to the group and its struggle and to an involvement in 
future mentoring at different levels extending to the junior high school level. The teachers 
(murabbi) for this training were not drawn from Indonesia’s ulama but were those who 
had been trained in the same process. Commitment was dependent on group cohesion and 
to becoming ‘complete’ or ‘total’ (kaaffah) Muslims. This invariably required a 
distinctive expression of life-style such as jilbab for women and beards, if possible, for 
men and a preference for alternative Muslim forms of music (nasyid). Tarbiyah refers to 
the whole of the process of education or guidance that is to lead to this personal 
transformation as a total Muslim23. 
 
Although the name of his training exercises was changed and Imaduddin himself was 
detained and never returned to teach at ITB, the campus movement he initiated spread 
rapidly from Bandung to other national university campuses throughout Indonesia. 
During the 1980s and into the 1990s there occurred a succession of national conferences 
to coordinate Campus Preaching Organization (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus) activities and 
                                                 
21 The banning of Masyumi led Mohammed Natsir and other leaders of the party to establish the 
Indonesian Council for Islamic Preaching [DII: Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia] whose 
purpose was to islamize Indonesian society. Its focus, like that of the movement that Imaduddin 
initiated, was to the educated community and particularly university students. The two, though 
independent, worked in tandem and in concert with one another. Natsir and his DII associates, 
many of them returned graduates from the Middle East, formed the Indonesian Committee for 
Solidarity with the Muslim World (KISDI: Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam) that 
called for militant action in the defence of Islam. 
22  Imaduddin became involved in ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, Muslim Youth 
Movement of Malaysia) and had Anwar Ibrahim as one of his students. 
23 Damanik in his book on the Tarbiyah movement, Fenomena Partai Keadilan (2002: 109-139), 
provides an outline of the training process of the movement as it had taken shape in the 1990s. 
 10
to strengthen the Islamic brotherhood (Ukhuwah Islamiyah) among campus organizations. 
By 1998, the 10th of these conferences, which was held at Muhammadiyah University 
Campus in Malang, there were representatives from 64 campuses in Indonesia.  
 
A key text published in 1980 by the Indonesian Council for Islamic Preaching (Dewan 
Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia) through its publishing arm, Media Dakwah was a volume 
of essays by Sayid Qutb, Petunjuk Jalan (Markers on the Path/Guide to the Path)24.  This 
volume has gone through numerous reprints and has been widely used for intensive cadre 
training. More than any other text, this volume has brought students within the Campus 
Preaching Movement into contact with the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. This, in turn, 
has led to the publication of a considerable body of translated literature on the Muslim 
Brotherhood 25  and to a preponderance of the ideas of the Brotherhood within the 
Dakwah/Tarbiyah movement as a whole26. 
 
The strength of the Tarbiyah movement on campuses throughout Indonesia gave it the 
capacity to establish active Islamic student groups, KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa 
Muslim Indonesia) and HAMMAS (Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim Antar Kampus), that 
played a key role in the protests and rallies that eventuated in the resignation of President 
Suharto and led, within the same period, to the founding of its own political party, Partai 
Keadilan (Justice Party), to contest the 1999 election.  It is noteworthy that the Tarbiyah 
movement’s vision of Islam has taken root and developed among ‘Habibie’s children’ – 
the generation of students, many with strong technical orientations, who were educated in 





                                                 
24 This is actually a composite volume, which includes four chapters from Sayid Qutb’s 
Fi Zilalil – Quran, plus a number of other essays. 
25 As a selection from a steady stream of this literature in Indonesia, one can cite:  Hasan al-
Banna and Mustohofa Mayshur,  Jihad Ikhwanul Muslimin: Sejarah, Program, Methode dan 
Tujuan Perjuangan [Jihad Ikhwanul Muslimin: History, Program, Method and Goals of Struggle] 
(1994);  Sayyed Quthub, Perdamaian dan Keadilan Sosial [Peace and Social Justice] (1996);  
Fathi Yakan, ‘Revolusi’ Hasan Al-Banna: Gerakan Ikhwanul Muslimin dari Sayid Quthb sampai 
Rasyid Al-Ghannusyi [The ‘Revolution of Hasan Al-Banna: The Muslim Brotherhood Movement 
from Sayid Quthb to Rasyid Al-Ghannusy: Translation of Manhajiyyah Al-Imam Asy-Syahid Al-
Banna wa Madaris Al-Ikwan Al-Mulsimin] (1998); Ali Gharishah, Da’i Bukanlah Teroris: 
Konspirasi Barat Menjerat Aktivis Islam [A Preacher is not a Terrorist: The Western Conspiracy 
to Ensnare Muslim Activists: Translation of  Du’aatun La’a Bughaatun] (2002);  Yusuf 
Qardhawi, Kenanganku Bersama Ikhwanul Muslimin [Personal Memories of the Ikhwanul 
Muslimin] 2003. 
26 There were other haraqah (movements) that entered Indonesia during this period and have vied 
for followers. These include the Hizbut al-Tahrir, Jama’ah Tabligh and Darul Arqam, which was 
officially banned in 1994. A formidable “Neo-Salafy” blend of Salafy ideas with those of the 
Muslim Brotherhood was represented and given Saudi funding through the Lembaga Ilmu 
Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA) and its campus dakwah organization, Khairu Ummah 




In the same period of religious ferment that saw the rise of the Taribiyah movement and 
other haraqah in Indonesia, there was also a considerable development of different forms 
of devotional Islam.  In 1984, under the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid, the Nahdlatul 
Ulama chose to withdraw from the political arena and to return to its basic foundations, 
concentrating on religious education and social welfare27 . A new generation of NU 
activists became involved with NGOs and other activists of different persuasions in 
efforts to improve social conditions in the country. In the process, NU’s rural bias was 
itself attenuated. 
 
Traditionally, NU has fostered the celebration of the rituals of Islam and through its 
network of tarekat has promoted a variety of devotional practices, such as intensive, 
collective and repetitive chanting of the confession of faith or of other Quranic formulae 
(dzikir/wirid). For an earlier generation, these tarekat rituals attracted an elderly 
generation. In the 1980s, these practices took on a more popular direction, drawing upon 
a broader spectrum of interest.  In some cases, these practices were organized through 
recognized tarekat and in other cases, they were developed through new hybrid 
mechanisms.  Emanating from key pesantren such as Suryalaya in West Java, the tarekat, 
Qadriyyah-Naqshabandiyyah, dramatically increased and extended its membership 28 . 
From Pesantren Buntut, Tijaniyah with its own distinct and relatively simple devotional 
rituals has become one of the fastest growing tarekat in Indonesia, particularly in urban 
areas. A good example of a new development during the period is the foundation de novo 
in the late 1980s of Pesantren Daarut Tauhid in Bandung by the charismatic figure, 
Abdullah Gymnastiar, commonly known as Aa Gym. Established as part of a personal 
mission, this pesantren was intended to be a ‘Workshop for Morality’ (Bengkel Akhlaq) 
among the unemployed youth of Bandung. Hugely popular at the time, one of its chief 
devotional practices involved ritual weeping for one’s sins in a concentrated effort to 
achieve purity of heart (qolbun salim)29.  From this initial base in Bandung, Aa Gym has 
become one of the most popular Islamic preachers in Indonesia today. Like the prolific 
writer and performer, Emhah Ainul Nadjib in Yogyakarta, Aa Gym combines various 




An inevitable consequence of the great effervescence of interest in Islam and of the 
significant increase in general education and literacy during Suharto’s New Order has 
been a flood of publications on all aspects of Islam. Over the past quarter century, the 
number of bookstores in the country has increased markedly and since the 1980s, the 
                                                 
27 This phase for NU called for the ‘return to the Khittah of 1926’. 
28 See Julia Day Howell, ‘Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival’ in The Journal of Asian 
Studies 60(3): 714. As background on this important pesantren, see Zulkifli: Sufism in Java: The 
Role of the Pesantren in the Maintenance of Sufism in Java (2002)   
29 For a brilliant ethnographic account of Pesantren Daarut Tauhid and its founder, see Dindin 
Solahudin, The Workshop for Morality: The Islamic Creativity of Pesantren Daarut Tauhid in 
Bandung, Java (1996). 
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section on religion in general and on Islam in particular has grown to a third or half of 
most every bookstore. Sales have soared and as a result, there has been a proliferation of 
publishers of Muslim books and wave of translations of books on Islam – primarily from 
Arabic and English. Within this tide of publications have come both works of great 
importance and a surfeit of pamphlets on every aspect of Muslim life. Many of these 
pamphlets are simplifications at best and propaganda at worst. 
 
“Pamphlet Islam” is a special arena for the propagation of ideas30. The often ephemeral 
nature of this kind of publication and its relative anonymity leaves it without a clear 
anchor in a particular community. Pamphlets that are translations from the Arabic and 
come from different parts of the Middle East are generally accorded a certain authority, 
even when the particular context of that authority is virtually unknown. 
 
Within this heterogeneous collection of publications, there has appeared a substantial 
body of literature in Indonesia on the plight of Islam throughout the world, the plots 
against it and the role of terrorism. Many of these pamphlets are anti-western, anti-
capitalist and pointedly anti-American. To provide a sense of these publications, one need 
cite a selection of titles. There are, first, translations of publications from the Arabic: 
Terrorist Action in Islam; Terrorism in the Mind of the Zionists; Jihad is not Terrorism or 
America: Dictator of the World.  The original title of this last little volume was 
‘Globalization or Americanization?’ but the Indonesian publisher decided upon the 
preferable title: America: Dictator of the World.   
 
Another category of this literature are tracts – some larger than pamphlets – that offer 
political analysis from an Islamic perspective: Behind the Invasion of Irak, After the Irak 
Invasion: America, Oil and the End of Pan-Arabism, or America on the Verge of 
Collapse. America on the Verge of Collapse is the Indonesian translation from the Arabic 
of a wide-ranging expose of all the ills in the United States ranging from economic 
oppression, racism, discrimination, Zionism, media-deception, criminality, prostitution to 
AIDS, narcotics and the Mafia.  
 
In another category are Indonesian booklets such as Jihad Osama versus America, Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir Opposes America, Western Hatred of Islamic Ideological Movements, or 
Da’wah and Jihad: An Islamic Movement that is not Terrorist. The subsections of this 
last volume offer a good idea of its content: America is an enemy of the world; the 
Palestinian people continue to suffer; Afghanistan has been forgotten; the American 
                                                 
30 I have taken this phrase, “Pamphlet Islam”, from Omid Safi whose point is the same as the one 
that I wish to make, namely that the ideas of Islam are by no means simple and that ideas of 
subtlety and complexity can not be conveyed within a few pages of text by some, often unknown, 
writer with a strongly held viewpoint. See Omid Safi, ‘Introduction’ to Progressive Muslims: On 
Justice, Gender and Pluralism: 2003: 22-23. The issue of “Pamphlet Islam” is a contemporary 
problem that deserves a great deal of consideration. It is particularly at odds with the pesantren 
tradition of education, which has concentrated on the considered interpretation of classic texts 
guided by authoritative teachers. See Bruinessen, ‘Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic Script Used in 
the Pesantren Milieu” in Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 146: 226-269 (1990) and 
Kitab Kuning: Pesantren dan Tarekat: Tradisi-Tradisi Islam di Indonesia (1995).  
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attack on Iraq represents an attack on the Muslim Community; the American attack is an 
attack on Islam; the Muslim Community accepts the clash of civilizations. In many of 
these pamphlets, Samuel Huntington’s work is cited and his thesis is accepted as valid: 
Islam’s clash with the West is inevitable and has already begun.   
 
The Huntington thesis is interpreted as giving authoritative support to the critical 
understanding of Sayid Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood that Islam is engaged in war of 
ideas (ghazwul fikri).  Although manifest in outbreaks of open warfare, the fundamental 
differences between Islam and the non-Islamic world of ignorance (jahiliyah) are those of 
ideas. This embraces everything that might be considered as civilization and extends to 
much of contemporary Muslim culture that has been tainted with foreign ideas. To quote 
the powerful words of Sayid Qutb: 
 
We are now living in a period of ignorance (jahiliyah) like the period of 
jahiliyah at the beginning of Islam and perhaps this jahiliyah is deeper now 
than then. Everything around us is jahiliyah: concepts and beliefs, customs 
and tradition, sources of knowledge, art and literature, law and forms of 
order. Still worse, much of what we consider as Islamic culture, Islamic 
sources, Islamic philosophy, Islamic thought are all fundamentally a product 
of this jahiliyah (Petunjuk Jalan, p 17).  
 
This stern vision requires not just a rejection of the West but a radical reformation of the 
Muslim world as it exists at present. This transformation of the world requires Muslims 
totally committed to Islam. 
 
Therefore within this body of literature, the most chilling pamphlets are those on suicide 
bombing: Palestinian Women’s Drum-Beat Summons to Jihad; Killing Oneself or a 
Martyr’s Death; Martyr’s Bombing from the Perspective of Islamic Law.  
 
Varieties of Mujahidin 
 
An underlying assumption of much of the Muslim literature published in Indonesia – and 
not just its pamphlet variety – is the belief that Islam is under grave threat. Whether this 
is seen as a world-wide threat for which Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and 
Iraq are prime examples, a national threat for which Ambon, Poso or Timor are taken as 
bitter instances or the more insidious threat that derives from corrupting and immoral 
influences on Muslim life, the response has been a call for the defence of Islam.  Those 
who have come forward as defenders of the faith regard themselves as mujahidin. 
Although this is by no means a new phenomenon in Indonesia, the past decade and 
particularly the period since the end of Suharto’s New Order has seen the emergence of a 
great variety of mujahidin organizations or of Muslim organizations with associated 
militia auxiliary. The diversity of these groups with their varying commitments is worth 
highlighting.  In 1999, the Majalah Tajuk listed no less than twenty-three such groups31. 
                                                 
31 Majalah Tajuk No 18, p 31, 28 October 1999. In addition to the larger and more nationally 
identifiable militia groups such as NU’s BANSER, or Front Pembela Islam, or Laskar Jihad, there 
are many such groups based on local or regional adherence such as Gerakan Reformasi 
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By 2004, the number of these groups had, if anything, increased. Given the nature of 
these groups, their interrelations and the fluidity of members, it is inappropriate to focus 
on any one group to the exclusion of the wider network comprising a majority of these 
groups 32 . It is possible, for illustrative purposes, to consider briefly the three most 
prominent of these groups: Front Pembela Islam, Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah 
Waljama’ah (FKAWJ), which is better known by the name of its armed militia Laskar 
Jihad and Jemaah Islamiyah.  
 
The Front Pembela Islam (FPI) or Islamic Defence Front is an interesting amalgam of 
elements. FPI was founded in 1998 by Al-Habib Muhammad Rizieq bin Husein Syihab, a 
former student at LIPIA who also studied in Saudi Arabia, and by K. H. Misbahul Anam, 
whose training at Pesantren As-Shidiqiyyah was more in line with that of Nahdlatul 
Ulama.  Habib Rizieq’s authority among his own local community of Jakarta/Betawi 
followers derives from his descent from the Prophet but the group claimed at one time to 
have a national membership of many millions. The primary mission of FPI was to protect 
the Muslim community against the gross immorality evident in Indonesia and its most 
notable activities have been raids on centers of entertainment (cinemas, restaurants and 
areas of drinking and known prostitution) in Jakarta.  
 
The Front campaigned actively for the implementation of Syariah Law and for the 
restoration of the Jakarta Charter to the Indonesian constitution. It also campaigned for 
Habibie and against the choice of Megawati as a woman for President. The Front’s 
pesantren base is Pesantren Al-Umm but most activities were run from its headquarters 
near Habib Rizieq’s home in Petamburan in Jakata. Although it has a complex 
administrative structure, the Front’s Anit-Immorality Board was the most prominent 
feature of the organization along with its uniformed, green-belted militia (Laskar 
Pembela Islam, Laskar Mujahidah and Laskar Cilik) who were organized into troops, 
each headed by a commander.  This militia was a mechanism for mobilizing armed bands 
among underemployed urban masses and was considered by many to have close links to 
elements in the military.  The Front was particularly active during 1999 and 2000 and – 
in face of criticism by various Jakarta ulama including K.H. Misbahul Anam, its founder, 
who has withdrawn from the organization – has seemingly ceased its operations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Masyarakat Banten, Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta, Ikatan Keluarga Madura (IKAMRA), 
Forum Silaturrahmi Remaja Masjid Jakarta, Ikatan Silaturrahmi Maluku, Majelis Dzikir 
Nurhaerat Poso or Gerakan Anak Monginsidi. 
32 The International Crisis Group in Jakarta under the direction of Sidney Jones has produced a 
number of exceptionally detailed analyses of the background, interconnections and local activities 
of the most important of these groups. See, in particular, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The case of 
the “Nguki Network” in Indonesia, Indonesia Briefing, 21 May 2002; Impact of the Bali 
Bombings, Indonesia Briefing, 8 August 2002; Indonesia Backgrounder: How The Jemaah 
Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, Asia Report No 43, 11 December 2002; Jemaah 
Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous, Asia Report No 63, 26 August 2003 
and Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, 3 February 2004. 
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The Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Waljama’ah (FKAWJ) or Laskar Jihad represents 
yet another kind of mujahidin organization, yet with elements similar to that of Front 
Pembela Islam. Like Front Pembela Islam, Laskar Jihad was a product of the post-
Suharto period. Its stated was to restore the honour and prestige of the Muslim 
community that has been sullied during the New Order.  
 
The Forum was founded by Ja’far Umar Thalib who, like Habib Rizieq, is of Arab 
descent. Ja’far Umar’s father was a religious leader who was active in Al-Irsyad in East 
Java33.  Ja’far Umar studied at Pesantren Al-Irsyad in Malang and had association with 
Pesantren Persis in Bangil.  He also studied for three years at LIPIA and then went on to 
the Maududi Institute in Lahore34. From Lahore, he went on to join the mujahidin in 
Afghanistan where he is said to have known Abu Sayyaf. After his return from 
Afghanistan and a brief stint in Indonesia, he traveled to the Middle East for further study 
and became a student of Syaikh Muqbil bin Hadi Al-Wad’i of Dammaz in North Yemen. 
On his return to Indonesia in 1993, he found Pesantren Iha’aus Sunnah in Yogyakarta as 
the religious center for the teaching of Salafiyah ideas of Islam35 and devoted himself to 
teaching and preaching. The establishment of the Forum, with regional assemblies 
throughout most of Indonesia, was an extension of these efforts.  
 
Laskar Jihad was created in early 2000 with the express purpose of sending fighters to 
Ambon to assist local Muslims in their struggle with Christians.  On the 6th of April 2000, 
Ja’far Umar launched Laskar Jihad’s campaign with great fanfare at a rally in Stadium 
Senayan in Jakarta and he then held well-publicized ‘national’ battle training in Bogor. 
By September it is estimated that he had sent over 1300 volunteers to Ambon. All 
underwent military training and all were expected to live by Syariah law and to follow 
‘the path of the campanions of the Prophet’ (manhaj salafi).  These fighters were 
organized into a command not unlike that of the Indonesian army with battalions of 
approximately 600 to 700 troops. 
 
Not only did Laskar Jihad send waves of fighters to Ambon who provided a significant 
component to the fighting, but it also carried on a war of ideas. It produced a bulletin on 
the fighting highlighting atrocities committed by Christians and the heroic defence of its 
own fighters. Laskar Jihad also produced a well managed website that gave it 
international notoriety. Its effective use of the media, its capacity to marshall support 
from a wide spectrum of Islamic groups and its ability to link elite circles of power with 
local Muslim communities demonstrated an impressive level of sophistication. Equally 
sophisticated was Laskar Jihad’s provision of free medical services and of support for the 
families of those fighting for Laskar Jihad as well as the provision of religious reading 
                                                 
33 Al-Irsyad is an historically important Islamic organization of Indonesians of Arab descent. 
34 Ja’far Umar is reported to have quarreled with his teacher both at LIPIA in Jarkarta and at the 
Maududi Institute in Lahore and he left both institutions because of his disagreements. On his 
return from Afghanistan, he was put in charge of Pesantren Al-Irsyad in Salatiga, but when his 
plans for reform of this pesantren were rejected, he left to travel in the Middle East. 
35The core curriculum included key texts by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab and Ibnu 
Taimiyah. 
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for Ambonese Muslim communities and of education and accommodation at different 
pesantren for victims of the fighting. All of this required considerable financial resources. 
As the fighting in Ambon lessened, there was a spillover of elements of Laskar Jihad into 
Irian and more importantly into Poso in Central Sulawesi, which had become another 
arena of Muslim-Christian conflict.  Then suddenly in the wake of the Bali bombing, 
Ja’far Umar dissolved Laskar Jihad and recalled his fighters, explaining that he was 
acting on a fatwa from his Imam in Medina36. His Forum (FKAWJ), however, continued 
its educational dakwah. 
 
The third of these mujahidin groups, Jemaah Islamiyah, is the most controversial, 
especially since many of its adherents claim that such a group does not exist. Sidney 
Jones who has done the most detailed researcg on this group and its activities refers to it 
as the “Ngruki network”, Ngruki being the popular designation of the Pesantren Al-
Mukmin located at Ngruki in Surakarta, Central Java. Founded by K.H. Abdullah 
Sungkar, Pesantren Al Mukmin is now headed by Ustadz Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Both men 
and many of their most committed followers were forced into exile in Malaysia during 
the Suharto period but returned after his retirement.  Abdullah Sungkar died and Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir was left to carry on this work. Ngruki is linked to other similarly oriented 
pesantren in Indonesia. Members of the Ngruki network have evident international 
connections with Al-Qaeda but also with other Islamic mujahidin groups in Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the southern Philippines37.  Graduates of Ngruki or its affiliates form a 
who’s who of the terrorists and terrorist suspects in Southeast Asia. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir 
is regarded as the spiritual leader of the group. He is currently in jail and is scheduled for 
further interrogation on new charges for terrorism when he is released. 
 
From the 5th to the 7th of August 2000, thousands of Muslims from a variety of  Islamic 
organizations gathered in Yogyakarta to hold the founding meeting of the Indonesian 
Council of Mujahidin (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia: MMI) at which Abu Bakar Ba’asyir 
was chosen as Amir. A number of distinguished academic and intellectual figures were 
also in attendance. The purpose of the Council was declared to work for the 
implementation of Syariah Law, the establishment of an Islamic State (Daulah Islamiyah: 
DI; also referred to as Negara Islam: NI) in Indonesia and the reconstitution of the 
caliphate. The gathering included many adherents of the former Darul Islam (DI) 
movement whose members form part of the Ngruki network38.  Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as 
Amir of the Council was able to attend its next congress in Tasikmalaya in January 2001, 
but subsequent trial and imprisonment has prevented him from further active involvement. 
The Council continues its activities and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir continues to be respected 
                                                 
36  No less than seven different Syaikh in Mecca, Medina and Yemen delivered fatwa that 
pertained to Maluku and urged Muslims to go to the protection of their fellow Muslims. For this 
and other information in the section, I am indebted to the work of Dr Jamhari who has written a 
detailed but as yet unpublished study of a number of mujahidin groups in Indonesia. 
37 See FN 32 for references to this “Ngruki network”. See also ES. Soepriyadi, Ngruki dan 
Jaringan Terorisme (2003) and Zuly Qodir, Ada Apa dengan Pesantren Ngruki  (2003).  
38 Darul Islam was a movement in the 1950s extending from Java to Sumatra and 
Sulawesi that took up armed struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state. 
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and supported by the Council. Pesantren Al-Mukmin also continues to attract dedicated 
students. 
 
In 2000 and 2001, the activities of all three of these mujahidin groups – Front Pembela 
Islam, Laskar Jihad and Jema’ah Islamiyah – were very much at the forefront of 
attention. While none of these groups, or more specifically the networks that support 
them, have disappeared, they are certainly no longer able to mobilize followers as they 
had previously done. A precarious secession of hostilities has been brokered in Maluku 
and extended to Central Sulawesi and the police have successfully captured many of 
those responsible for the Bali bombing and the Marriott Hotel bombing, whose impact on 
public opinion was considerable. At the same time, the political situation in Indonesia has 
moved on in preparation for the 2004 general and presidential elections.   
 
The 2004 General Elections in Indonesia 
 
On the 5th of April Indonesia carried out what was the third genuinely democratic 
election in its history. This single-day election was probably the most complex election of 
its kind ever undertaken with more than 147 million eligible voters choosing candidates 
from 24 parties for a National Representative Assembly (DPR), Provincial 
Representative Assemblies (DPRD) Regency and City Assemblies and – to add to the 
complexity of the ballot – a new national Regional Representative Assembly (DPD). For 
the National, Provincial and Regency Assemblies, voters had to choose parties and 
candidates from those parties whereas for the new Assembly, votes were required to 
choose candidates without party affiliation. While all of this was done in a day, it will 
take weeks to sort out the results of the election and come to some understanding of its 
national and local implications. And all of this is prelude to the election – in one, or 
possibly two stages – of the next president and vice-president. The election also offers a 
glimpse of the development of Islam as a factor of political influence within the country. 
 
The results of the election of parties at the national level can be broadly viewed in terms 
of ‘bundles’ consisting of roughly 20% of the vote. The Golkar Party won the first of 
these bundles with over 21% of the vote (21.58% to be exact); Megawati’s Democratic 
Party of Struggle (PDIP) won the second of these bundles with over 18% (18.53).  
Together these two national ‘secular’ parties received 40% of the vote. The next bundle 
was won by two Islamic parties. Abdurrahman Wahid’s National Awakening Party with 
just under 11% (10.57%) of the vote and Hamzah Haz’s United Development Party (PPP) 
with over 8% (8.15%) of the vote (total:18.72%) . This can be viewed as the broadly 
traditional Islamic vote, though certainly not entirely traditionalist in orientation. The 
next bundle was captured by three different parties: a new secular party, the Democratic 
Party headed by a former general and cabinet minister, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, that 
obtained over 7.45% of the vote; an Islamic party, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) 
headed by Hidayat Nur Wahid that obtained 7.34 % of the vote; and another broadly 
Islamic party, the National Mandate Party headed by a notable political figure and former 
head of Muhammadiyah, Amien Rais that obtained just under 6.44% of the vote 
(total:21.23%) The final bundle of roughly 20% consists of the 17 other parties whose 
success ranged from 2.5% of the vote to less than .5% of the vote. The majority of these 
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parties are secular in orientation but some of the more successful are Islamic in 
orientation. The two most successful Islamic parties (PBB and PBR) between them 
obtained just over 5% of the vote. A division of the total vote for all parties would divide 
roughly 60/40, secular/Islamic.  
 
Particular attention in the election focused on the remarkable success of the new parties, 
the Democratic Party and the Prosperous Justice Party. Both campaigned on anti-
corruption platforms and both had their greatest success in Jakarta where each gained 
over 20% of the vote.  Whereas the Democratic Party moved immediately to establish a 
presidential and vice-presidential slate (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla 
from the Golkar Party), the Properous Justice Party has held back to consider its options 
and its possibilities for political alliance. The first publicized activity by the Head of the 
Prosperous Justice Party, Hidayat Nur Wahid, was to pay a visit to the imprisoned Abu 
Baker Ba’asyir, thus sending a clear signal of his sympathies within the spectrum of 
Islamic allegiance. 
 
The Properous Justice Party (PKS) is a product of the Tarbiyah movement. It is indeed 
the continuation of this movement in the political arena.  In the previous election, it stood 
as the Justice Party (PK) but changed its name to be able to contest the 2004 election as a 
‘new’ party. PKS is, in many ways, a new kind of party in Indonesia: well-organized by 
cadres, whose educated members live simply and, if elected, surrender their salaries to 
the party in return for a living allowance. Committed to Syariah Law and to the ‘Medina 
Charter’, the party campaigned primarily on an insistence that they would promote justice, 
good governance and stamp out corruption. Not only did the Party poll 22.8 % of the vote 
in Jakarta, it gained 11.5 % in West Sumatra, 11.4 % in Banten, 10.8 % in West Java,   in 
Banten, 12.8% in North Maluku, 9.6% in Maluku, and 9.5 % in East Kalimantan. This is 
an impressive spread both in key provinces of western Indonesia as well as in eastern 
Indonesia.  One of the areas where the Party gained less than 3% of the vote – one of its 
lowest showings in a predominantly Muslim area –  was East Java where voting of over 
30% went to the Abdurrahman Wahid’s National Awakening Party. Central Java was 
also low at 4.7%.  These figures point to differences in orientation among Islamic parties. 
 
To some, the rise of the Prosperous Justice Party will be seen as an ominous political 
development. It is potentially, however, a fortunate development – one of the most 
important developments within the Muslim world. It gives voice to an orientation in 
Islam that can not be denied, minimized or overlooked. This orientation has too often 
flourished when it has been denigrated or suppressed. As a participant in the political 
process, the new Properous Justice Party must endeavor to deliver on what it promises or 
suffer the loss its adherents. The full participation of the Party in the democratic process 
offers a model for the future39. 
                                                 
39 The Party has, not unexpectedly, an excellent website, www.keadilan.or.id that sets forth the 
Party’s program and manifesto. Indeed if one wishes to follow the development of ideas within 
different Muslim groups in Indonesia, one must attend to their different websites. Another 
website of importance is that of the Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal: JIL) which 
represents the most outspoken critical source of opposition to a narrow, literalist interpretation of 






In this paper, I have tried to provide some idea of the diversity of Islam in Indonesia and 
to give a sense of the historical context of this diversity. Some would claim that there is 
polyphony in this diversity but it is equally possible to identify discordance. There is also 
a tendency among some observers to distinguish between radical and moderate Muslims. 
At the extremes, this is undoubtedly possible but it is certainly no longer a simple or 
straightforward task to sort out clearly the middle ground. 
 
As I have indicated, there is a contrast between traditionalist views that would consecrate 
the world in the name of Islam and reformist views that would insist on remaking it, but 
these views now interpenetrate one other. Instead of a clear divide between so-called 
moderates and so-called radicals, there is a broad spectrum of individual opinions which 
shift and recombine on different issues. Appreciating this interplay of ideas is crucial to 
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